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IS AN INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS
PROTECTABLE UNDER § 43(A) WITHOUT HAVING
ACQUIRED A SECONDARY MEANING? Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.CT. 2753 (1992), rehearing denied,
113 S.CT. 20 (1992).
Fariba Soroosh*
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1992, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
inherently distinctive trade dress1 is protectable under Section
43(a)2 of the Lanham Act3 [hereinafter the Act], without a showing
that it has acquired a secondary meaning.4 In affirming the Fifth
Circuit's decision, the High Court followed that Circuit's reasoning
that trade dress should be protected by the same principles applica-
ble to trademarks because they both serve "the same statutory pur-
Copyright © 1993 by Fariba Soroosh.
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1. In defining trade dress, the Court adopted the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' defini-
tions. The Fifth Circuit "quoted from Blue BellBio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253,
1256 (5th Cir. 1989): 'The "trade dress" of a product is essentially its total image and overall
appearance.' Id. See [Taco Cabana Int'l, Ina v. Two Pesos, Inc.], 932 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th
Cir. 1991)." Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2755 n.1 (1992), rehear-
ing denied, 113 S.Ct. 20 (1992).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that trade dress "involves the total image of a product
and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics,
or even particular sales techniques" (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). Id.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). The Court considered the version of the code prior to
the 1988 amendments. It provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or repre-
sentation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or
deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that
of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false
description or representation.
Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2761 n.1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 ed.)).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
4. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2753.
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pose of preventing deception and unfair competition."' Justice
Byron White wrote the opinion joined by six other members of the
Court, Justices Stevens and Thomas filed separate concurring opin-
ions, and Justice Scalia concurred with the majority and with Jus-
tice Thomas's opinion.
The holding in this case, granting trade dress protection to the
particular motif of a restaurant chain, is significant for several rea-
sons. First, the Court resolved a conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals and determined that § 43(a) does not impose a blanket
secondary meaning requirement for trade dress protection. This
case sets forth the rule that a distinctive trade dress should get the
same treatment as a distinctive trademark under § 43(a). Hence,
protection is granted when a particular mark or dress is either in-
herently distinctive6 or has become sufficiently distinctive through
acquiring a secondary meaning7.
Second, the Court declared that the Fifth Circuit had been cor-
rect in applying trademark analysis to trade dress, because there is
no textual basis for treating the two differently. The protection of
both is necessary in achieving legislative purposes behind the Lan-
ham Act.8
Finally, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that a new
inherently distinctive dress that has not attained a secondary mean-
ing be given temporary protection, to be terminated if a secondary
meaning is not achieved over time. The Court reasoned that if a
trade dress is granted protection in the first place without having a
secondary meaning, then it must be inherently distinctive and capa-
ble of identifying its source. Such a dress deserves continued pro-
tection without regard to its ability to succeed in the market and
attain a secondary meaning.
BACKGROUND
Taco Cabana, respondent, opened its first restaurant in San
Antonio, Texas, in 1978. Customer response to this Mexican res-
5. Id. at 2755.
6. An inherently distinctive trade dress is capable of identifying a product or service's
source because of its intrinsic nature. Id. at 2757.
7. "Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or dress 'has come
through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.'" Id. at 2756 n.4 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, Cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1990)).
8. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2755 (1992), rehearing de-
nied, 113 S.Ct. 20 (1992).
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taurant with its festive motif9 was so favorable that by 1985, respon-
dent had opened five more restaurants in the San Antonio area.
Two Pesos, petitioner, opened its. first restaurant in December
1985, in Houston. Petitioner's atmosphere and decor were very
similar to that of the respondent. Petitioner expanded rapidly in
Houston and other Texas cities, but did not enter the San Antonio
area. In 1986, respondent started to expand into other markets, in-
cluding Austin, Dallas, El Paso and Houston, where petitioner was
also doing business.
In 1987, respondent sued petitioner in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas I° for trade dress in-
fringement under § 43(a), and for theft of trade secrets under the
Texas common law"1 . Respondent claimed that it had a trade dress
that was protectable under § 43(a) from its inception, "i.e., an elab-
orate, consistently maintained combination of structural and decor
elements that give it a consistent look."' 2
A jury trial ensued, in which the jury was instructed to return
its verdict in the form of answers to five questions. "The jury's an-
swers were: Taco Cabana has a trade dress;13 taken as a whole, the
trade dress is non-functional;l 4 the trade dress is inherently distinc-
9. The respondent described its Mexican trade dress as
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior
and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the
outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building is
a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes.
Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Id.
10. Taco Cabana International, Inc. and Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., No. H-
87-0026, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16068 (S.D. Texas 1988).
11. On this issue the jury concluded that Two Pesos had misappropriated Taco Ca-
bana's trade secrets, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos,
Inc., 932 F.2d at 1124. Petitioner did not appeal this decision.
12. Briefs Are Filed in Mexican Restaurant Trade Dress Case, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 1077, at 523 (April 16, 1992).
13. The District Court instructed the jury: "'Trade dress' is the total image of the
business. Taco Cabana's trade dress may include the shape and general appearance of the
exterior of the restaurant, the identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the
menu, the equipment used to serve food, the servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on
the total image of the restaurant.'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753,
2754 n.1 (1992).
14. Respondent's dress would be functional if, as a whole, it was essential to the very
nature of being a Mexican restaurant. "The Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally func-
tional, and thus unprotectable, if it is one of a limited number of equally efficient options
available to competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered by according the
design trademark protection." Id. at 2760 (citing Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732
F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)).
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JO URNAL
tive; the trade dress has not acquired a secondary meaning in the
Texas market; and the alleged infringement creates a likelihood of
confusion on the part of ordinary customers as to the source or as-
sociation of the restaurant's goods or services."15 Since the jury was
instructed that Taco Cabana's trade dress would be protectable if it
had either acquired a secondary meaning or was inherently distinc-
tive, judgment was entered for Taco Cabana. The trial court
awarded Taco Cabana $2.8 million in damages"1, and "held that
Two Pesos had intentionally and deliberately infringed Taco Ca-
bana's trade dress." 7
On appeal, petitioner argued that the jury's finding of no sec-
ondary meaning contradicted their finding of inherent distinctive-
ness. 8 According to petitioner, what Taco Cabana had was a broad
and functional business concept which did not come under the lim-
ited protection of trade dress. 9 Petitioner further argued that if
such a concept is granted trade dress protection, it should only be
for a limited time.20 If no secondary meaning is attained during this
time, protection should cease and aggressive competitors should be
allowed to expand in the market using the same business concept.21
The Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's argument, and affirmed the
District Court's judgment.
The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that their approach in this
case was in conflict with the Second Circuit.22 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals on the question of whether trade dress which is inherently
distinctive is protectable under § 43(a) without a showing that it has
acquired secondary meaning."
23
15. Two Pesos, at 2756. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court assumed that the jury
was correct in their findings. Id. at 2758.
16. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991). In
calculating this figure, the District Court doubled the damages award and granted attorney's
fees. See Inherently Distinctive Trade Dress Is Protectable Without Secondary Meaning, PAr.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 1088, at 213 (July 2, 1992).
17. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2756. The Fifth Circuit agreed with this holding stating
that "[t]he weight of the evidence persuades us .... that Two Pesos brazenly copied Taco
Cabana's successful trade dress, and proceeded to expand in a manner that foreclosed several
important markets within Taco Cabana's natural zone of expansion." Id. 2756 at n.5 (quot-
ing Two Pesos, 932 F.2d at 1127 n.20). This holding seems to have only affected the amount
of damages awarded to respondent, and did not have any bearing on the High Court's analy-
sis and holding.
18. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2754.
19. See Briefs Filed in Mexican Restaurant Trade Dress Case, supra note 12.
20. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2754.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2756.
23. Id. at 2757 (citing 112 S.Ct. 964 (1992)). The Court noted that certiorari was not
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DISCUSSION
The Second Circuit Approach Rejected
In Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc. 24, the Second
Circuit held that "§ 43(a) protects unregistered trademarks or de-
signs only where secondary meaning is shown."2 That Court did
not adopt the view that an "unregistered mark was capable of iden-
tifying a source and that copying such a mark could be making any
kind of false statement or representation under § 43(a). ' '26 The ra-
tionale underlying their decision was that "unregistered marks did
not enjoy the presumptive source association enjoyed by registered
marks and hence could not qualify for protection under § 43(a)
without proof of secondary meaning."2 7 Although this Circuit later
altered its position and waived the secondary meaning requirement
for nondescriptive suggestive marks28, they have continued to im-
pose such a requirement on trade dress under § 43(a).29
The Supreme Court rejected this approach because, as Justice
White noted, it was "in considerable tension with the provisions of
the Act."30 The Court reasoned that since section 231 of the Act,
which sets out trademark registrability requirements only requires a
secondary meaning for descriptive marks, there must be marks
being granted "on the second question presented by the petition, which challenged the Court
of Appeals' acceptance of the jury's finding that Taco Cabana's trade dress was not func-
tional." Id. at 2757 n.6.
24. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
25. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2756 (1992) (citing Chevron
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981)).
26. Id. at 2759.
27. Id. (citing Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
28. Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1985).
29. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759-60.
30. Id. at 2759.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. This section sets out circumstances under which a trademark
would not be registrable. Only two subsections are at issue in this case:
No Trade mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on
account of its nature unless it ....
(e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or
(2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily
geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, except as in-
dications of regional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title,
or (3) is primarily merely a surname.
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a)-(d) of this section, nothing in
this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant
which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce ....
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1992).
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(such as distinctive ones) that qualify without having a secondary
meaning.3 2 The Court also stated that "These same marks, even if
not registered, remain inherently capable of distinguishing the
goods of the users of these marks.""3
The Court found support in other Circuits that follow the ap-
proach used by the Fifth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has held that if the dress is inherently distinctive, proof of secon-
dary meaning is then needless.34
Fifth Circuit Approach Adopted
In afirming the Fifth Circuit's judgment, the High Court ap-
proved of, and adopted, that Circuit's approach to trade dress pro-
tection under § 43(a). "The Fifth Circuit was quite right in
Chevron" , and in this case, to follow the Abercrombie classifica-
tions36 consistently and to inquire whether trade dress for which
protection is claimed under § 43(a) is inherently distinctive."37
The analysis is therefore two fold; first, the mark or dress has
to qualify for registration3 1 under § 2 of the Act; and second, it has
to be examined under § 43(a) for non-functionality and likelihood
of confusion.39 The second step is straight forward, the first one
deserves a detailed discussion.
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.4, Judge
Friendly set out what was to become the traditional trademark reg-
32. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759.
33. Id., see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 supra note 31.
34. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2760 (citing Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc,,
826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974 (1Ith
Cir. 1986) (The Eleventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit approach in Chevron, infra note
35); Excerpts From The United States Trademark Association's Amicus Brief in Two Pesos...,
82 THE TRADEMARK REPORTER 440 (May-June 1992)(the United States Trademark Associ-
ation supports the Fifth Circuit's position that inherently distinctive trade dress may be pro-
tected without proof of secondary meaning).
35. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th
Cir. 1981).
36. See discussion infra pp. 10-12.
37. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2760.
38. The Court stated that actual registration is not required for protection under
§ 43(a). They reaffirmed the position taken earlier in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Labo.
ratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982), that § 43(a) "prohibits a broader range of practices than
does § 32 [15 U.S.C. § 1114], which is applied to registered trademarks .. " Two Pesos, 112
S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting Inwood, supra at 858). The Court went on to say that "it is common
ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general princi-
ples qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under
§ 43(a)." Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757.
39. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2758.
40. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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istrability analysis under § 2. According to this classic formulation,
trademarks are usually classified in categories of increasing distinc-
tiveness.41 "[T]hey may be (1)generic; (2) descriptive; (3) sugges-
tive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful."'42 The latter three categories are
entitled to registration because they are inherently distinctive, that
is, "their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a
product."'43 Conversely, marks that "refer to the genus of which
the particular product is a species," or generic marks, are not regis-
terable. 4 In between these two extremes, there exists the descrip-
tive mark category, into which the respondent's dress fell.
Pursuant to § 2(e) of the Lanham Act, purely descriptive
marks are not registerable because they do not identify the particu-
lar source, but merely describe the product.4  However, § 2(f) of
the Act provides that descriptive marks that have "become distinc-
tive of the applicant's goods in commerce" are registerable.46 The
Supreme Court in Taco Pesos, in harmony with the Fifth Circuit,
held that this general rule, usually applicable only to trademarks,
should also be applied to trade dress protection cases.47 Justice
White cited the most recent definition of distinctiveness as "an iden-
tifying mark [that] either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has ac-
quired distinctiveness through secondary meaning."'48
The Court reasoned that an inherently distinctive trade dress is
also capable of identifying its source,49 and that "the protection of
trade dress serves the same statutory purpose of preventing decep-
tion and unfair competition."5 0  Furthermore, the Court consid-
ered it important that there was no textual basis in § 43(a) either
mentioning the concept of secondary meaning, or supporting the
different treatment of marks and dresses.51 The only specific re-
quirements for protection under this section, and the second part of
the analysis, is establishing non-functionality and lack of likelihood
of confusion among consumers.5 2 Additionally, the Court foresaw
41. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch 537 F.2d 4).
42. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985)).
45. Id.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), supra note 31.
47. Two Pesos, 112 S.CL at 2760.
48. Id. at 2758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, pp.
37-38, and comment a (Tent.Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990)).
49. Id. at 2754.
50. Id. at 2760.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2758.
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the adverse effects of imposing a blanket secondary meaning re-
quirement on all inherently distinctive trade dress, and was ex-
tremely concerned about its anti-competitive effects.
The Court disfavored imposing such a requirement because it
would be contradictory to the free enterprise ideology that un-
derlaid the Constitutional basis of trademark protection. It would
also undermine the legislative intent behind the Act. In regard to
this, the court stated:
Protection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the
Act's purpose to secure the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish
among competing producers. National protection of trademarks
is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the pro-
ducer the benefits of good reputation.5 3 By making more difficult
the identification of a producer with its product, a secondary
meaning requirement for a nondescriptive trade dress would hin-
der improving or maintaining the producer's competitive
position.54
Petitioner's Limited Protection Argument Rejected
The Court rejected petitioner's proposal that a distinctive trade
dress be granted temporary protection at the outset subject to termi-
nation if secondary meaning is not attained over time. The Court
held that there was no textual basis in § 43(a) for this concept. Us-
ing the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme Court stated that
"[i]f temporary protection is available from the earliest use of the
trade dress, it must be because it is neither functional nor descrip-
tive but an inherently distinctive dress that is capable of identifying
a particular source of the product." ' The Court felt that lack of
market success and consumer recognition over an unspecified pe-
riod of time were not valid bases for discontinuing protection. 6
"The user of such a trade dress should be able to maintain what
competitive position it has and continue to seek wider identification
among potential consumers. '57
Some analysts see this holding as a sign that the Supreme
53. Id. at 2760 (quoting Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
198 (1985)).
54. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2760 (1992), rehearing de-
nied, 113 S.Ct. 20 (1992).
55. Id. at 2759.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Court recognized the doctrine of "secondary meaning in the mak-
ing.""8 This doctrine aims at protecting an inherently distinctive
trade dress that has not yet been identified by the public as belong-
ing to a certain proprietor. Hence, trade dress originators would
have the chance to build up their reputation and compete in new
markets, while being protected against imitators who would deter
competition and expansion. The Court believed that an opposite
holding would discourage start-up companies from entering the
market, knowing that their original, nonfunctional and inherently
distinctive trade dress would not be protected absent enough con-
sumer recognition for a secondary meaning.59
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion, but
maintained that there was no textual support for that decision in
§ 43(a). Instead the holding was the logical result of the gradual
transformation of the meaning of § 43(a) by the Federal Courts,
and was well supported by Congress's codification of these changes
through recent amendments to the Act.'
In light of the general consensus among the Courts of Appeals
that have actually addressed the question, and the steps on the
part of Congress to codify that consensus, stare decisis concerns
persuade me to join the Court's conclusion that secondary mean-
ing is not required to establish a trade dress violation under
§ 43(a) once inherent distinctiveness has been established.61
Justice Thomas also concurred with the judgment of the Court,
but believed that the decision was well grounded in the common
law, codified by Congress in § 43(a). 62 Furthermore, he believed
that the majority's analysis and interpretation of § 2, would lead to
the misconstruction of that statute.63 Justice Scalia fied a concur-
ring statement stating that although he joined the opinion of the
Court, he was in complete agreement with Justice Thomas's analy-
58. See Howard R. Popper, A Tale of Tacos and Trade Dress, NEW JERSEY L. J., Au-
gust 17, 1992, at 14. "Prior to Taco Cabana, the doctrine had been applied.., in Jolly Good
Industries, In. v. Elegra, Inc, 690 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), but had been put into doubt
by the Federal Circuit in... Cicena Ltd. v. Colombia Telecommunications Group, (CAFC
1990)." Id. According to the article, the doctrine was finally rejected by the Second Circuit
in Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Ina, (May 15, 1992). "Taco Cabana would seem to overrule...
Cicena Ltd... . as well as... Laureyssens .. " Id.
59. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759.
60. Id. at 2761-2766.
61. Id. at 2765.
62. Id. at 2766-67.
63. Id. at 2766.
1993]
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sis which was complementary to the Majority's opinion."
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to this ruling, trade dresses enjoy the same protection
as trademarks under § 43(a). Additionally, the Court removed re-
gistration as a prerequisite to protection under the Act, and re-
placed it with a registrability requirement. Hence, first the mark or
dress must be registerable under § 2 by being either inherently dis-
tinctive or having attained a secondary meaning. Second, if regis-
terable, the analysis shifts to § 43(a) and the mark or dress must be
non-functional and unlikely to create confusion among the consum-
ing public.
The Supreme Court aimed at giving effect to the legislative
purposes behind the Act of preventing deception and unfair compe-
tition. Since both trade dress and trademarks perform the same
source identifying function and achieve the purposes of the Act,
protection of both under a uniform federal standard is necessary
and logical. This decision provides a clear guideline as to exactly
what kind of trade dress is protected for both new start-ups desiring
to gain trade dress protection and competitors who would like to
enter the market using a similar idea. There are no anti-competitive
effects because if the dress is functional, descriptive, or generic, it
will not be protected.
64. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2761.
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